Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States institutionalized a strategy commonly described as “dirty wars” as a central component of its foreign policy in West Asia. This strategy relied on targeted killings, extrajudicial operations, and cooperation with governments accused of serious human rights violations, while extending operational practices previously employed in South America. Employing a qualitative documentary research design, this study asks how the dirty wars strategy has been articulated in U.S. foreign policy toward West Asia and how its internal contradictions have contributed to its persistence and adaptation over time. The analysis draws on U.S. national security documents issued between 2002 and 2025, selected reports of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, public opinion surveys conducted by credible polling organizations through 2026, and investigative reporting from leading journalists across the U.S. political spectrum. The findings demonstrate that dirty wars have been legitimized through national security discourses emphasizing preemptive deterrence and expanded self-defense, despite only limited domestic public support. Drawing on a dialectical approach, the article argues that while dirty wars may generate short-term tactical gains, they simultaneously erode the normative and institutional foundations on which they depend, producing long-term strategic costs. These contradictions necessitate continual revision of both the justificatory discourse and the mechanisms of implementation, thereby enabling the strategy to persist through adaptation rather than fundamental transformation.