The JCPOA incorporated provisions for resolving disputes among the parties, commonly referred to as the “snapback mechanism.” Following the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA and the continued imposition of unilateral U.S. secondary sanctions, Iran, invoking Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA, took a series of steps to reduce its nuclear commitments. These measures subsequently provided the basis for initiating the snapback mechanism. This study seeks to answer the following question: “What sanctions would the activation of the snapback mechanism impose on Iran, and which of these sanctions would constitute new and economically costly restrictions compared with the existing U.S. secondary sanctions?” Using a descriptive-analytical approach and thematic analysis, the study examines the scope and implications of the sanctions associated with the snapback mechanism. The findings indicate that nearly all United Nations sanctions have, in practice, already been incorporated into and enforced through the existing U.S. secondary sanctions regime against Iran. Therefore, except for its potential effects on expectations and psychological perceptions, the activation of the snapback mechanism is unlikely to generate significant additional real effects on Iran’s external economic transactions.